THE FINANCING CHALLENGE
Arresting human-induced climate change requires global action to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions sharply. To have a 50% chance of keeping the global mean temperature increase below 2°C, global emissions have to fall by between 2.5% and 3% per year on average between 2010 and 2050 (Bowen and Ranger, 2009 ).
Developing economies 2 now account for well over half of global emissions and their
share is growing relative to that of developed economies, 3 so if the 2°C ceiling is not to be exceeded, they will have to start reining in their emissions soon (Clarke et al, 2009 ). And as climate change is likely to hit poorer countries sooner and harder than it will hit developed nations, the former will have to undertake a disproportionate amount of adaptation. A wide range of ethical frameworks suggest that developed countries should finance a significant share of the necessary spending on mitigation and adaptation in developing nations -100% according to some value systems. 4 Reflecting this consensus, developed countries have agreed, as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to cover the "agreed full incremental costs" of implementing mitigation measures and to "assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation." These commitments have been reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan and the Copenhagen Accord, with the latter setting a goal for developed countries to mobilise jointly US$ 100 billion a year by 2020 "to address the needs of developing countries."
This agenda raises several questions considered further below. First, what should the balance be between private and public sources of finance? Second, how can private sources of finance be generated? Third, how should public funds be raised by individual governments and by international collaboration? This article discusses the criteria that economic analysis suggests. Fourth, it asks, how do specific proposals rate according to these criteria and others? The article concludes with the hope that governments will act speedily to fulfil the promises of the Copenhagen Accord but without neglecting the principles of public finance in the process.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SOURCES OF FINANCE
The simple textbook prescription to deal with the greenhouse gas externality, a global cap-and-trade system with appropriate allocation of tradable emissions quotas across individuals, countries and time, would entail a reliance on private sources of finance.
It would generate a world price for emissions, so that private agents would internalise the externalities they cause. The lump-sum transfers across individuals necessary to correct any adverse distributional impact from the imposition of a price and the residual climate damages would be achieved by appropriate allocation of quotas. The allocation could also be used to compensate those who had to spend proportionally more on adaptation. 5 Private finance flows would be generated entirely in emission reduction markets. Local investments in mitigation and adaptation would be financed by private agents in the developing countries themselves, with the help of their share of revenues from those markets and guided by the changes in relative prices over products and across time induced by the carbon price.
However, this prescription is highly unrealistic. In practice, the problem of the GHG externalities is compounded by several other market failures, many of which need to be tackled by public policy. There are also public policy failures, such as the lack of credibility of the policy framework that can arise when governments cannot bind their successors. Where climate-change action in developing countries involves these externalities, financial support from developed nations is likely to have to involve public finance. Also, emission reduction markets cannot be relied upon to deliver resources to all those who need to make climate-related investments, particularly those required for adaptation. If projects in developing countries need to raise private finance abroad, they must be able to offer an expectation of an appropriate riskadjusted return, which in many cases they will be unable to do without public support,
given the administrative costs and other obstacles. 5 The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that, under certain (rather restrictive) conditions, every Pareto-efficient allocation of resources can be achieved by a competitive market equilibrium. When it holds, the problems of efficiency and distributional impacts across individuals can be separated (Varian, 2009) . If introducing emissions pricing to correct the inefficiency induced by the GHG externality has adverse distributional consequences, these can be corrected by lump-sum transfers, set to ensure that at least someone is better off after the pricing is implemented while no-one else is made worse off. The point here is not to rehearse the restrictiveness of the assumptions necessary for the theorem to hold (complete markets, perfect competition, etc), but to emphasise that in this framework lump-sum transfers are necessary for the introduction of emissions pricing to be unambiguously welfare-enhancing.
One key market failure affects innovation. Many types of knowledge have the characteristics of a public good -one firm using an idea does not prevent another firm from doing so. That tends to lead to underinvestment in the creation of knowledge.
Hence public subsidies to such activities are warranted, including to climate-related R&D tailored to the needs of developing countries. The public sector can redirect technological progress by supporting development of low-carbon technologies that have not benefited from extensive experience. But the initial costs of adopting a lowcarbon development path will be higher, underlining the need for early public intervention to reduce emissions cost-effectively over time. And there are numerous problems arising from inadequate and unevenly distributed information, which the public sector may be able to help solve by collecting and disseminating knowledge that would be under-provided by the private sector.
Another important source of market failure is the existence of network externalities:
an enterprise joining a network does not take into account the benefits that accrue to others from the expansion of network membership. Without public intervention, the market initially underinvests in expanding the network. Hence public support is likely to be necessary for the development of network infrastructure in developing countries, notably in energy distribution. It may be easier for the public sector to set up the network rather than to calibrate and apply the appropriate initial subsidies to stimulate private provision.
The malfunctioning of financial intermediation is another obstacle to adequate private flows of finance. Without political stability, regulatory certainty and administrative simplicity, perceived risks can undermine incentives to invest in projects with large up-front costs (as is typical of many mitigation projects 6 ). That can make projects that appear to pass cost-benefit tests unattractive in practice. And when private-sector financial intermediation is impaired (as it is at the moment) by reduced risk appetite, heightened doubts about counterparty solvency and increased uncertainty about asset valuations, the public sector may be able to act as a financial intermediary of last resort. In some developing countries, financial intermediation is rudimentary or nonexistent, partly because of the low levels of income.
A further reason for public-sector support for developing country actions is to demonstrate the commitment of developed-country policy-makers to announced policies, thus building credibility and strengthening the impact of incentives to alter private-sector behaviour. Policy commitments that include financial or reputational incentives for all participating governments to achieve announced outcomes can enhance the credibility of the policies and help to align the interests of policy-makers more closely with those of private agents. Thus public support for developingcountry actions, especially through multilateral frameworks endorsed collectively by all participating governments, can help to strengthen actions by the private sector.
At present, with the credibility of international endeavours to achieve a global deal on climate change in question, uncertainty about the global climate policy regime after 2012 increasing, firms in developed countries still cautious about investing and private trade and capital flows still impaired, support for developing countries' actions in the near term is likely to have to be much more reliant on public funding than in the 6 Thus private finance is likely to be easier to raise for project operation, where revenues and costs are more closely aligned in time, than for capital investment, unless there is public intervention.
future. And pervasive market failures, together with the inability of dealing with international income distribution impacts simply with global quota allocations, justify some public component continuing in the long term. But if global carbon markets can be developed further and their long-term credibility underpinned, the contribution from private funding could be much more substantial. Such a contribution might also be less subject to the changes of political will and time inconsistency of policymakers, which have led to considerable scepticism about the reliability of developed countries' pledges on development aid.
The sources of finance for adaptation are likely to be somewhat different from those for mitigation. Private economic agents will generally be in a better position than public authorities to assess most adaptation needs, given their variety and specificity to particular locations (although some infrastructure investment is likely to require more government involvement). Many adaptation investments will be small-scale and likely to be financed through conventional private means. The challenge is to design mechanisms to distribute flows of public finance to support the incomes of those with the greatest adaptation needs and to help them with the costs of private finance.
GENERATING PRIVATE FINANCE
Economists have debated at length the merits of emission reduction markets relative to emissions taxation. 7 The former approach ensures that, once negotiators have agreed on how the markets are to function and how property rights are to be assigned, private flows of funding are generated. 
RAISING PUBLIC FINANCE
Public finance theory, as articulated for example in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) and Kay (1990) , gives guidance as to how public finance for supporting developing countries' actions should be raised.
First, public authorities have a choice between raising taxes (or fees and user charges) and borrowing. The general principle is to tax to finance current spending and borrow to finance public investment; the social return on the investment should be expected to exceed the cost of raising funds (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004; Ismihan and Ozkan, 2008) . From the perspective of a developed-country government, that suggests that transfers to developing countries should be financed by tax revenue. But there is some ambiguity if the developing country uses transfers to invest in mitigation and adaptation that will pay off in the future; should the developed country count that as part of its own social return?
If the case for countercyclical deficit financing by governments is accepted, that justifies a greater share of borrowing, but only in the downturn of the business cycle;
an 'exit strategy' to substitute other funding sources is necessary if the associated spending is to continue during recovery. Third, taxes raise questions of equity as well as efficiency. Hence the ultimate incidence of new taxes needs to be considered and, if necessary, the welfare system adjusted to compensate losers. In practice, that is often difficult without changing incentives and thereby affecting economic efficiency. As a result, governments often 11 The relationship between environmental policy and business cycles is discussed in Bowen and Stern, 2010. 12 Unfortunately, governments are often better at identifying goods that they should subsidise because of the presence of market failures than they are at identifying untaxed bads. But revenues from environmental taxes are surprisingly low in many countries (European Commission, 2008 and 2010a). prefer to finance new obligations by raising tax revenues across the board, so that the incidence of the tax system is unchanged, on the assumption that it already broadly reflects distributional preferences and efficiency considerations.
Fourth, traditional public finance theory frowns on hypothecation of revenues from particular sources to particular uses, except when setting a user charge to cover the marginal costs of a publicly provided good (OECD, 1996; McCleary, 1991) . With the latter exception, there is no reason why the revenue generated by the appropriate tax rate on one activity (e.g. global financial transactions) should equal the appropriate spending on another activity (e.g. public support for developing countries' climate policies). Even if tax rates and spending are initially set so as to bring about the equality needed, there is no guarantee that they will remain so over time.
The same is true with many activities that are apparently related to each other. For example, there is no reason why the revenue from an optimal global carbon tax should equal the optimal spending on adaptation and mitigation at the chosen target level of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Indeed, the 'double dividend' literature 13 is predicated on the possibility that revenues from carbon taxation (or quota auctions)
could also be used to reduce distortionary taxes, such as payroll taxes, elsewhere in the economy. The efforts to set different carbon prices for intramarginal mitigation (e.g. by establishing lower carbon prices for avoided deforestation than for electricity generation) suggest that policy-makers suspect that uniform carbon pricing could raise revenues well in excess of mitigation needs. The mere fact that two activities are climate-related does not justify earmarking the revenues from taxing one of them for spending on the other.
Some have argued that hypothecation is likely to make it easier to ensure that funds raised are additional to previous commitments by developed countries (Müller, 2008; Oxfam, 2008) . But finding a new source of revenue and then earmarking it does not prevent the earmarked spending from displacing spending, financed from other sources of tax revenue, on the same objectives. Additionality is not guaranteed by how the funding is raised (Landau, 2003) .
Pirttilä (1998) has advanced a more sophisticated argument for hypothecation:
hypothecating the revenues from environmental taxation to the provision of public goods that benefit the losers from the environmental policy may improve welfare (compared with lump-sum transfers) if governments do not have enough information to discriminate more carefully among the losers. That provides some justification for allocating the revenues from carbon taxes or quota auctions to public goods benefiting those hit hardest by carbon pricing. But it does not justify earmarking revenues from non-climate-related sources to climate actions, nor revenues from climate-related sources to mitigation that does not primarily benefit those affected most by carbon pricing.
Brett and Keen (2000) offer a more political explanation for hypothecation, showing how a 'green' incumbent government may choose to earmark revenues if the efficiency loss from doing so is outweighed by the value of constraining subsequent and potentially 'non-green' policy-makers from diverting the funds raised. Hence hypothecation can be seen as a device to discourage back-sliding. It is a moot point whether policy-makers at present are likely to be greener than their successors. If so, that does not bode well for the long-term credibility of the international climate policy framework.
Where specific sources of finance are hypothecated, given the drawbacks of earmarking, it is necessary to consider whether the revenue raised will over time meet either a specific financial target (such as the Copenhagen Accord's US$ 100 billion per year) or, more generally, the equitable share of developing countries' evolving climate action needs.
Fifth, public finance theory flags the importance of administrative costs, including compliance and monitoring costs, so it is helpful to consider whether proposals entail new administrative burdens or use the most efficient existing tax-raising and disbursement channels. Taxes applied to a broad base but at low rates are attractive in this respect to keep tax avoidance activities low.
International collaboration among developed-country governments is desirable in delivering public finance flows where these reflect obligations taken on in the context of international negotiations or where economies of scale in monitoring, verification and reporting are important. But that does not imply that co-ordination of revenue sources is necessary. Governments may agree about the appropriate uses of funds without agreeing about appropriate sources. The exception to this principle is when new tax instruments are found to be desirable but would have cross-border implications, as with the taxation of, for example, cross-border pollutants, activities outside individual countries' jurisdictions and cross-border financial transactions. In such cases, the distributional implications of the new tax would have to be considered as well as the modalities of levying it.
SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
There have been many specific proposals as to how to help finance developingcountry action on climate-change mitigation, adaptation and related capacity building, emissions-quantity-based scheme in the face of macroeconomic shocks. Also, experience suggests that CDM private finance is more attracted to some project types that others -it does well with renewable energy and non-CO 2 GHG abatement, but not so well with energy efficiency and transportation, probably because of the various additional market failures involved in the latter. Another potential problem is that the extension of the CDM to low-abatement-cost options, for example, in forestry, could drive down the price of CERs. One possible response would be the introduction of a new type of offset credit not fully fungible with the CERs. But that would reduce the incentive for developing forest carbon sinks at the margin. If the price of CERs fell too far, that would be a sign that developed country caps were not tight enough and should be brought down.
Overall, expanding carbon markets in general and the CDM in particular looks an attractive option. It stimulates private finance flows, helps to 'get prices right,' is overcoming administrative problems and has already been subject to much useful scrutiny. Monitoring, verification and reporting are already a central concern.
Hypothecation is justified if one believes that the level of emission reduction targets assigned to Annex 1 countries is appropriate given the required reduction in global emissions by 2050 and ethical perspectives on equity across countries. The scale could be big enough at least to address developing countries' mitigation needs. But the precise size of flows is difficult to predict, depending on, among other factors, emissions prices in developed countries and the offset rules they adopt. National and international climate policy regimes have to ensure that demand for offsets rises along with their supply or, in other words, that effective carbon prices are kept high enough to match the level of global ambition for climate-change mitigation. This category of proposals could generate substantial finance flows; a sale of 2% of AAUs could raise US$ 14-25 billion, depending on the price. As with the CDM, it has the benefit of helping to establish an emissions price. And, like the CDM, its revenue prospects depend on having a regime ensuring tight emission caps on Annex 1 countries in the future.
However, under the Norwegian proposal, countries may seek less stringent caps to compensate for some (or even more than) the AAUs auctioned. That would reduce the environmental benefit and lower the price. Second, private entities would need to be able to buy the AAUs and use them for compliance to create a demand for the (ii) Taxes on global 'bads'
AAUs (currently installations covered by the EU ETS cannot use AAUs
Landau (2003) suggests taxing congestion in maritime straits, rights to geostationary orbits and associated radio frequencies and arms sales -activities that generate more clear-cut adverse externalities than do financial transactions. These taxes no doubt have merit on environmental or other social grounds and would probably need to be levied at an international level. But the arguments against hypothecation apply with some force. A tax raised by a supranational body could still be distributed to member nations according to some rule rather than earmarked to some collective international objective. And the sums that would be raised are very uncertain, given that the issue of the optimal tax rates has not been explored.
(iii) Financial transactions taxes
Financial transactions taxes have been proposed as a way of reducing financial instruments' price volatility and the excessive allocation of resources to financial market intermediation (e.g. Schulmeister et al, 2008; Baker, 2008) and can be seen as attempts to tax a social 'bad.' James Tobin proposed a tax on spot foreign exchange transactions to reduce currency speculation and volatile cross-border capital flows as early as 1972. They could raise significant sums; a tax rate of a mere 1-2 basis points 21 could raise US$ 15-28 billion (but note that the euro trades against the US dollar with spreads as tight as 1/10th of a basis point). Atkinson (2004) suggested this approach to funding the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.
Such taxes suffer from three main drawbacks as sources of funding for climate action.
First, the drawbacks of hypothecation are particularly relevant given competing potential uses for international funds of this sort. Second, the amount that could be raised is very uncertain, because the price elasticity of transactions with respect to transactions costs is very uncertain and liable to change according to circumstance (e.g. whether there is a financial panic). Some proposers want to limit the taxed activity while others hope that a very low tax rate would not affect trading volumes at greater length than is practical in this article. The HLAG group potential sources of finance into public sources, development bank instruments, carbon market finance and private capital, assessing each against the eight criteria specified in their terms of reference: revenue-raising capability, efficiency, equity, incidence, practicality, reliability, additionality and acceptability. They conclude that the US$ 100 billion target is "challenging but feasible" if a variety of measures are taken, to stimulate both public and private financial flows. However, they do not make specific recommendations for action. Like the author of this article, the HLAG stresses that "[i]nstruments based on carbon pricing are particularly attractive because they both raise revenue and provide incentives for mitigation actions." The economic disadvantages of some proposals are mentioned (e.g. that levies on cap-abnd-trade offset purchases are effectively a tax on mitigation actions), although the drawbacks of revenue hypothecation are not fully explored.
Two aspects of the report are particularly helpful. First, quantitative estimates of the potential flows from particular measures are compiled on a consistent and transparent basis. Where arbitrary assumptions have to be made, for example about the proportion of new levies that would be earmarked for climate-change finance, they are lad out clearly and are consistent across instruments. Second, a distinction is drawn between gross and net flows. The latter are likely to be considerably lower than the former, particularly for private capital flows, given that private agents expect a competitive risk-adjusted return on their investments. However, the report makes clear that not all members of the HLAG agreed about how net flows should be calculated or whether the target should be regarded as a target for net additional flows.
There was also disagreement about whether private flows should be included. As a result, the report does not provide an illustrative breakdown of how the target can be reached, although it is possible to piece one together from the assessments of individual measures.
This article argues that considerations of equity warrant substantial transfers from developed to developing countries, so that the net basis is the appropriate one to use, notwithstanding the difficulties in estimating net flows. Also, private and public net flows should be considered; private investment can still generate net flows to developing countries because there are intramarginal rents to be captured from mitigation and adaptation investments after deducting a competitive marginal rate of return.
On this basis, the HLAG report suggests that, assuming a carbon price The main conclusions are:
• There is an important role for private finance. The key incentive is to have pervasive and broadly uniform emissions pricing around the world. Public authorities can stimulate private finance by helping to manage the risks of investing in mitigation, adaptation and technological innovation. Building the credibility of the long-term international climate policy framework is one of the main challenges in this regard. Private finance will be particularly important for adaptation, as the latter will depend to a greater extent on private decision-makers.
And, within the right framework, it may be less subject to the vagaries of political popularity than public finance flows would be.
• Public finance is warranted by a range of market -and policy -failures associated with climate change and its mitigation. As well as the central environmental externality imposed by GHGs, there are problems in stimulating innovation, establishing infrastructure networks and overcoming barriers to financial intermediation. That is particularly the case while the long-term outlook for climate policy is still unclear to prospective private investors and, because of the world economic slowdown, the short-term outlook for returns on any investment is poorer than usual.
• Raising tax revenues may be preferable to borrowing as a means of raising public finance, although the economics is not clear-cut. The current budget worries of many developed countries tip the balance further (although the pace of fiscal retrenchment necessary is subject to robust debate), but the need to build policy credibility points in the opposite direction. Theory also advocates taxing 'bads,' of which a number have escaped the tax base so far. But it discourages hypothecation of specific revenue streams to particular uses.
• There is a plethora of ideas and proposals for old and new forms of finance for climate action in developing countries. How much could or should be raised is very uncertain in most cases. So is how multiple schemes would interact. Several could have untoward consequences for emissions prices. Hypothecation is a frequent feature, with very little discussion of whether it is warranted. In many cases, it is clearly not warranted.
• Two sets of proposals do particularly well judged against this analysis: (i)
expanding the scale and scope of the CDM (ii) expanding the use of international financial institutions' balance sheets, including the use of SDRs. But, in both cases, governance arrangements are subject to controversy. There are a number of other proposals for new taxes that have merit as far as revenue generation is concerned but the case for earmarking the revenue raised for climate-change finance is not wholly compelling, resting as it does on the supposed benefits of pre-commitment by developed-country governments rather than a quantitative assessment of developing countries' needs..
It is to be hoped that governments will act speedily to fulfil the promises of the Copenhagen Accord but without neglecting the principles of public finance in the process.
